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Bhopali survivor-activists chained themselves to the gates of Dow Chemical’s Mumbai office, demanding that Dow (1) obey the summons issued by a Bhopal court; (2) pay additional compensation and; (3) clean up the site.
Continue reading Direct Action at Dow Chemical Mumbai – Photos
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COVER
i – BHOPAL GROUP FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION
ii – CONTENTS
iii – List of Appendices and Tables
iv – Map showing gas-affected areas of Bhopal
1 – INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
– The Bhopal Gas Disaster is an unprecedented event
– Government’s response fraught with apathy and lack of innovation
2 – Durga Bai
3 – Disbursement of compensation is a task of unprecented magnitude
– OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
– Data Collection
4 – Photos, Shakti Nagar, New Gandhi Nagar
5 – Study Population, Methodology, Findings and Discussion
– PROBLEMS IN IDENTIFICATION OF GAS VICTIMS
– i. Children born after the disaster
6 – ii Incomplete coverage by surveys, claim registration and issuance of ration cards
7 – iii. Substantial number of residents are not receiving interim relief
8 – PROBLEM IN AFFIXATION OF COMPENSATION AMOUNTS
– i. Medical examination of gas victims is incomplete
– ii. Essential tests have not been carried out on a large majority of the medically-examined population
9 -iii. A large majority of the medically-examined population has not been informed about the categories alloted to them
10 -iv. Medical categorization of claimants reveals gross underestimation of injuries
– 3. USE PATTERN OF GOVERNMENT MEDICARE
11 – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
– i. Alternative scheme for disbursement of compensation
12 – ii. Watchdog committee needed to monitor disbursement
– iii. Medical Commission should be set up to supervise and monitor healthcare of victims
– REFERENCES
13 – APPENDIX I: CRITIQUE OF MEDICAL CATEGORIZATION
– The process of injury assessment followed by the Madhya Pradesh government is faulty
– Is a rational assessment of injury possible?
14 – Basis for interim relief
– APPENDIX II: ENCROACHMENT ON CIVIL RIGHTS
– Report of an investigation into “Anti-Encroachment Drive” by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, M.P., June 1991
15 – The re-victimization of the victims
– The demolition of houses
– Terror and protest
16 – Why were these slums chosen for demolition?
– Legal procedure not followed
17 – Supreme Court order
– Rehabilitation
– CONCLUSIONS
18, 19, 20, 21 – APPENDIX III: SCHEDULE OF SURVEY
22, 23 – APPENDIX !V: HEALTH DAMAGE DUE TO BHOPAL GAS DISASTER – REVIEW OF MEDICAL RESEARCH
24 – APPENDIX V: A NOTE ON THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE BHOPAL GAS VICTIMS
– Final disbursement based on the proposed scheme will lead to major delays
– The proposed scheme will lead to a denial of adequate compensation to the majority of the victims
– The scheme will give rise to large scale corruption
– The scheme is susceptible to abuse by non-victim persons
25 – Alternative scheme for disbursement of compensation
– Outline of alternative scheme
– ADVANTAGES OF THE ALTERNATIVE SCHEME
– The scheme outlined will provide for a fair level of compensation and cause the least disruption to the life of the community
– The alternative scheme will enable compensation to be received immediately
– The alternative scheme curtails the involvement of middlemen
– The alternative scheme safeguards the interests of the gas victims
26 – APPENDIX VI: WARD WISE CATEGORIZATION FIGURES PRESENTED BY THE DIRECTORATE OF CLAIMS, M.P. GOVERNMENT, UP TO DECEMBER 30, 1989
27 – APPENDIX VII: THIRD WORLD NETWORK FEATURES – CASE EXAMPLES OF VICTIMS OF CATEGORIZATION
– Suleman Khan
– Shakila Bi
– Premlata
– Bhojraj
28 – Chhotelal
– Narayani Bai
– Aladin
29 – TABLES
– Table I: Number of male and female residents in the three bastis and number of children born after the gas disaster
– Table II: Number and percentage of people not covered by ICMR and TISS surveys, claim registration and issuance of ration cards
– Table III: Number and percentage of people not receiving interim relief
30 – Table IV: Number and percentage of people left out of medical examination
– Table V: Number of persons and percentage of medically examined population administered specific examinations
– Table VI: Number and percentage of people who have not received notification about their categories
31 – Table VII: Number of persons and percentage of notified population receiving different categories
– Table VIII: Number and percentage of people visiting government hospitals and private clinics
32 – ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ERRATA
BACK COVER
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A chronicle of the continuing medical catastrophe in Bhopal with supporting medical papers and reports, documents, press cuttings, articles and research studies.
––The immediate effects of gas exposure and Union Carbide’s response.
–– Survivors’ first clinic and sodium thiosulphate scandal.
–– Damaged births in the aftermath of the gas leak.
— Refusal of UCC and later Dow to share medical studies into the effects of MIC poisoning.
–– Assessment of the effects of MIC poisoning.
–– Medical criteria for the disbursement of relief.
–– Government hospitals in Bhopal. Shortcomings and attitude to survivors. Supreme Court Monitoring Committee reports.
–– Foundation of the BMHRC and reports on its performance.
–– ICMR research projects. Cut off after just ten years and latterly resumed after survivors’ protests.
— Studies into the contamination of soil and water by chemicals abandoned at the derelict Union Carbide factory and their effects on the human body.
–– Sambhavna clinic research studies.
Eckerman, Ingrid. “The Bhopal Gas Disaster 1984 – Children’s Acute and Chronic Exposure to Toxic Substances” (PDF). Power point presentation (2010)
Eckerman, Ingrid. “The Bhopal Saga — Causes and Consequences of the World’s Largest Industrial Disaster.” (PDF). Power point presentation in easy English (2008)
Eckerman, Ingrid. “The Bhopal Gas Leak — too late for good epidemiology.” (PDF). Poster presentation (2007)
1985
Editorial
New England Medical Journal
Bhopal Technology
Emergency Medicine
Genetics
1986
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine I
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine II
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine III
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine IV
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine V
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine VI
Legal Medicine
1987
Environmental Health Perspectives I
Environmental Health Perspectives II
Environmental Health Perspectives III
Environmental Health Perspectives IV
Environmental Health Perspectives V
Environmental Health Perspectives VI
Environmental Health Perspectives VII
Environmental Health Perspectives VIII
Environmental Health Perspectives IX
Environmental Health Perspectives X
Environmental Health Perspectives XI
Environmental Health Perspectives XII
Environmental Health Perspectives XIII
Environmental Health Perspectives XIV
Environmental Health Perspectives XV
Environmental Health Perspectives XVI
Environmental Health Perspectives XVII
Environmental Health Perspectives XVIII
Environmental Health Perspectives XIX
Environmental Health Perspectives XX
Environmental Health Perspectives XXI
Environmental Health Perspectives XXII
Environmental Health Perspectives XXIII
Environmental Health Perspectives XXIV
Environmental Health Perspectives XXV
Environmental Health Perspectives XXVI
Environmental Health Persepectives Conclusion
1987 – ICMR – 2.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 3.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 4.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 5.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 6.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 7.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 8.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 9.pdf
1987 – ICMR – 10.pdf
1987 – ICMR.pdf
1987 – Opthalmology.pdf
1987 – respiratory french.pdf
1988
1988 – British Journal of Experimental Medicine.pdf
1988 – Indian Journal of Experimental Biology.pdf
1988 – Social Science Medicine Jasanoff.pdf
1988 – Social Science Medicine.pdf
1990
1990 – Environmental Health Perspective.PDF
1990 – Human genetics.pdf
1990 – ICMR.pdf
1990 – Nature.pdf
1990 – Statistical Review of ICMR Study.pdf
1991
1991 – Forensics – Mass Deaths.pdf
1991 – Respiratory CT Scan.pdf
1992
1992 – Internationalizing Bhopal.pdf
1993
1993 – Dhara editorial.pdf
1993 – Lancet b.pdf
1993 – Lancet.pdf
1994
1994 – Medicine, Science, Law.pdf
1995
1996
1996 – Lancet.pdf
1996 – National Medical Journal.pdf
1996 – Respiratory.pdf
1996 – Risk Analysis.pdf
1997
1997 – BMJ Respiratory morbidity – BMJ.pdf
1997 – Chemosphere.pdf
1997 (1977 reprint^) – respiratory.pdf
1998
1999
1999 – Cancer Causes Control.pdf
2000
2001
2002
2002 – Dhara 2.pdf
2002 – Dhara.pdf
2002 – Lancet B.pdf
2002 – Lancet.pdf
2004
2004 – BMJ.pdf
2004 – Dhara.pdf
2004 – environmental disaster – sriramachari.pdf
2004 – Science.pdf
2005
2005 – Broughton.pdf
2005 – Lancet.pdf
2005 – ONLY PAGES 126-130 mental health report.pdf
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On the night of December 3, 1984, 22 year old Kumkum Saxena sat in her home atop Idgah hill in Bhopal studying for a neurology exam the next day. The phone rang. Hysterical voices talked about a chemical leak, pleading for help. “Oh God, they’ve done it again,” Saxena exclaimed. Chemical leaks were not new for her. They were the reason she resigned from Union Carbide.
It was the India of 1975. Starry-eyed Kumkum Saxena could barely believe she had landed a job as a medical officer with Union Carbide. “Fancy me working for an MNC! I was thrilled,” she says. Seven years later, the lustre had faded. Her frequent alerts about safety hazards, norms not followed, rubber masks not worn, had turned her into the girl “creating panic,” an embarrassment for the management. “They were painting such a rosy picture,” she says. “I would scream about silica dust and hydrocarbon levels. The more vocal I was, the more I was kept away. I did not get a pay raise and soon I was barred from management meetings.” At the end of 1982, Saxena decided it was time to quit.]
“Go against the wind. Put a wet cloth on your face to dissolve the gas,” Saxena told frantic callers. Poisonous methyl isocyanate (MIC) was choking the air. “There was so much gas, the leaves outside my door were singed,” Saxena says. “Had I panicked and opened the door, I would have been killed.” Nearly 20,000 were.
The next morning, the roads of Idgah hill were lined with blue faces and pink froth. “If only Union Carbide had told people how to protect themselves,” she says, “instead of running helter-skelter, thousands would not have left their houses.” It is such measures that Saxena had insisted upon. She knew how simple it was to prevent death.
But Saxena’s story begins before the night of December 3, 1984. That is why it is significant. She describes her job at Carbide as similar to that of a “school nurse” — running a medical centre with four beds and treating injured workers. As part of her training, she visited the research and development labs at the plant, realised the plant was producing extremely toxic chemicals, and learnt about threshold limits. “There was exposure to chemicals at totally unacceptable levels. There’d be a bag full of acid sitting there waiting to kill somebody. Silica and hydrocarbon levels were higher than prescribed. Sometimes there would be a leak not fixed, and yet the personnel were allowed to go there.”
On her own initiative, she began conducting regular blood tests. Often she’d find damaging results. “I’d remove employees from harmful exposure and treat them until the blood counts were normal again.” There were minor leaks “all the time”. The alarm sirens went off at the plant a few times a month, but “we’d contain them” before any fatalities.
The turning point came when one of those leaks did prove fatal. It was 1981. Ashraf Muhammed, a worker, was found drenched in phosgene (a poison gas used in both the World Wars). “We rushed him into the shower, but it was too late.” His death shook Saxena. She feared that if urgent steps were not taken, “there could be many more Ashrafs”. The world’s worst industrial disaster happened in Bhopal two years later.
“The warning bells should have gone off after Ashraf died,” she says. “That’s when I began insisting on a mass scale evacuation procedure.” It was the one thing Saxena was determined to have implemented. “People living near a toxic plant have the right to know what to do in disaster scenarios,” she says.
YET THE response was predictable — the equivalent of “shush little girl, the elders know better”. Saxena wasn’t surprised. “It’s expensive to keep people safe,” she says. “For a plant that wasn’t making money, that was too much trouble.” The year 1983 brought unprecedented financial losses at Union Carbide. That year, the monsoons were late, the cotton crop failed, and Indian farmers didn’t need Carbide’s product — the pesticide Sevin. India’s American dream seemed to be fading.
“Truckloads of Sevin came back,” Saxena says. “The losses were so huge, the company cut back on maintenance. There was an absolute disinterest in doing anything.” A plant with toxic chemicals, corroding structures, no maintenance, a demoralised workforce and apathy: “It had the makings of a perfect storm,” she points out.
Already the unused MIC being stored — three tanks full — was above permissible levels. Saxena says that because the plant was in a no-production mode, all the safety features — a flare tower that burns the gas, a series of valves and vents — that would have normally “contained” the MIC leak on December 3 were “switched off”.
Saxena — Kumkum Modwel after marriage — left India soon after the disaster. She now works as a primary healthcare physician in Connecticut, US. As she left, she carried with her the memory of a day that need not have happened, of lives that could have been saved. “I had a choice that day — to take my neurology exam or go to the ward. I chose the ward. I knew they’d be short of doctors,” she says. She remembers working with “five syringes”, trying to save the “chaiwala who used to give me samosas”, the Nepali boy, the halwai and his wife gasping for breath. “One of the reasons I wanted to leave the country is best explained by this line from Shakespeare: ‘Fair is foul and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filthy air.”
WRITER’S EMAIL: tusha@tehelka.com
WHAT VICTIMS GET, WHAT BHOPAL WANTS
On June 22, a Central Group of Ministers attempted to set right 26 years of neglect by announcing a new package for Bhopal victims:
• Rs 1,500 crore for compensation and rehabilitation. Rs 300 crore for the clean up of toxic waste
• Setting up of an ICMR centre in Bhopal
• Rs 220 crore for upgradation of designated Bhopal hospitals
• Curative petitions to the Supreme Court to review the 1991 out-ofcourt settlement of $470 million with Union Carbide; to review 1996 dilution of charges from culpable homicide to criminal negligence
• Warren Anderson’s extradition and the promise to pursue criminal liability of Dow Chemical
This is the Bhopal Campaign’s response to the offer:
• Compensation is based on a flawed system of damage assessment designed to downplay death and injury
• Only 40,000 victims — less than 10 percent — will receive adequate relief
• The GOM has not heeded the citizens’ demand for an Empowered Commission on Bhopal to oversee rehabilitation. Instead, it has passed on Rs 720 crore to the Madhya Pradesh government. Ministers and bureaucrats will pocket the money
• Much more than Rs 300 crore is required to clean the waste. The contamination has not yet been assessed
• The government plans to dump the waste in Pithampur, where families live within 200 metres. This violates the CPCT guidelines on toxic waste disposal. Instead, waste should be excavated and sent to a country that has disposal mechanisms
• The talk of hauling up Dow Chemical for liability is lip service. This has been the position of the Law Ministry for the last five years. GOM has made no recommendation on how Dow will be made answerable to an MP court
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NEERI report executive summary 1994
NEERI report executive summary 1997
Bhopal case First Information Report (FIR)
Key source documents in the unheard case against UCC
The case against Union Carbide Corporation by Michael V. Ciresi
Confidential minutes of meeting of Group of Ministers on Bhopal, June 2010
2009
Letter from US Members of Congress to Dow Chemical, June 16, 2009 Letter from Members of Congress marking the 25th anniversary of the Union Carbide gas disaste and asking Dow Chemical to accept its inherited liabilities in Bhopal
2006
Report from US India CEO Forum, March 2006, convened in 2005 by President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The document outlines plans for economic partnership and identifies obstacles. P13: “Specific focus on resolving legacy issues such as those impacting Dow/ Bhopal tragedy of 1984 … would send a strong positive signal to US investors.” Document sourced from: http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/USIndia.pdf
Emails relating to India’s request for the extradition of Warren Anderson
US intelligence report from Mumbai, July 26, 2004
Foia_13_India_will_request_extradition.pdf
Foia_221_Articles_or_emails-1.pdf
Email from Burson-Marsteller to Dow and Carbide PR people
Warren Anderson should not be extradited to India
Report from US India CEO Forum, March 2006, convened in 2005 by President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The document outlines plans for economic partnership and identifies obstacles. P13: “Specific focus on resolving legacy issues such as those impacting Dow/ Bhopal tragedy of 1984 … would send a strong positive signal to US investors.” Document sourced from: http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/USIndia.pdf
Letter from US Members of Congress to Dow Chemical, June 16, 2009 Letter from Members of Congress marking the 25th anniversary of the Union Carbide gas disaste and asking Dow Chemical to accept its inherited liabilities in Bhopal
Union Carbide proposal for building an MIC plant in Bhopal Includes the pages which reveal that important technology was “unproven”. 49 pages.
Excerpt from May 1982 safety audit of the Bhopal plant by US engineers
Export-Import Bank of the United States documents
Union Carbide Eastern assessment of the failing UCIL factory in Bhopal
September 1984 Safety Survey of MIC unit at Institute, West Virginia
Dow-Union Carbide Corporation Merger document
These documents were obtained via the ‘discovery process’ in a class action suit brought by victims of water contamination against Union Carbide Corporation in New York.
There are five hundred and eighty four (584) pages of private memos, letters, telexes and press cuttings, presented here in the order they were placed by Union Carbide. They need reorganising by date and subject. The work of cataloguing them all and putting them on the site will take some time, but work in progress can be seen below.
BOX 1
PoisonPapers1 1.pdf
Page 2 of undated letter from C.K. Harayan, Resident General Manager of EIIL (Eveready Industries India Limited) referring to quantities of Sevin residue and Naphthol tar on the site (44.55 and 2.54 metric tonnes respectively) and referring peevishly to IICT Hyderabad work on which he has not had a progress report.
PoisonPapers1 2.pdf
June 23, 1998, From C.K. Harayan at Eveready to MPPCB’s Chief Scientific Officer Dr P.C. Seth in reply to the latter’s letters 10715 dated 18.6.98 and 8351 dated 14.5.98. The work of closing the landfill is nearing completion and monsoon allowing will be finished within a month. The secured landfill is constructed only on one part of Pond III. Mentions writing to four laboratories about doing chemical analyses of soil and water based on NEERI parameters. The four are, NEERI, Nagpur, IICT, Hyderabad, ITRC Lucknow and NCL, Pune.
PoisonPapers1 3.pdf
June 22, 1998. Harayan’s letter, mentioned above, Eveready to NEERI, IICT, ITRC and NCL about chemical analysis of soil and water samples from in and around the Solar Evaporation Ponds. Samples are to be collected under the supervision of MPPCB officials. The targeted properties and elements of the samples (as per NEERI report) are enclosed.
PoisonPapers1 4.pdf
The parameters to be analysed. Targets were calcium, magnesium, sodium, potassium, chloride, sulphate, organic carbon, nitrate, carbaryl and alpha naphthol.
PoisonPapers1 5.pdf
June 22, 1998. Harayan, Eveready to ITRC Lucknow, inviting them to analyse soil and water samples from the Solar Evaporation Ponds. Parameters enclosed.
PoisonPapers1 6.pdf
The parameters to be analysed. Targets were calcium, magnesium, sodium, potassium, chloride, sulphate, organic carbon, nitrate, carbaryl and alpha naphthol.
PoisonPapers1 7.pdf
15 June 1998. “Inspection Report on the Progress of Solar Evaporation Ponds at EIIL, Bhopal” by R Swaminathan. He visited the site between April 20, 1998 – June 15, 1998. Details of work included laying LPDE sheets, covering with clay, laying network of perforated PVC pipes, covering with gravel and fine sand and final clay cover. The work was found to comply with the specifications given in NEERI’s November 1992 report.
PoisonPapers1 8.pdf
June18, 1998, Dr P.C. Seth of M.P. Pradushan Niyantran (MPPCB) to Harayan in EIIL. In Hindi. Letter 8351 referred to in #2 above, reminding him that the Board had ordered testing to be carried out and asking him to get it done within a month and keep the Board informed of progress.
PoisonPapers1 9.pdf
June 6, 1998. Press cutting from Madhya Pradesh Chronicle. TANK LEVELLING WORK STOPPED BY GOVERNMENT. “The Minister for Local Self Government has issued orders to the officers concerned to stop illegal levelling of tanks in Union Carbide premises containing chemical waste with immediate effect.”
PoisonPapers1 10.pdf
Ditto Dainik Bhaskar in Hindi, June 6 1998
PoisonPapers1 11.pdf
June 4, 1998. Inspection Report, Joshi and Associates. Finds some materials needed for the work of closing the landfill missing, others “not up to the mark”, work not properly done. The work would have to be concluded speedily as rain was expected in 15 days.
PoisonPapers1 12.pdf
June 4, 1998. National Mail. UCC DUMPING TOXIC CHEMICALS IN PONDS
PoisonPapers1 13.pdf
June 3, 1998. MP Chronicle. TOXIC REMAINS IN UC PREMISES BEING COVERED UP. Sangathan leader Abdul Jabbar warn of danger to ground water citing pungent smelling water in Atal Ayub Nagar and J.P. Nagar.
PoisonPapers1 14.pdf
May 14, 1998. Upmanyu, Member Secretary of MPPCB to Harayan at EIIL. In Hindi. Noting that sediments from ponds 1, 2 and 3 have been spread in pond 3. and expressing the worry that the imminent monsoon rains would fill the drained ponds and that surrounding areas could run the risk of being contaminated.
PoisonPapers1 15.pdf
STUDIES ON THE SAFE DISPOSAL OF SEVIN AND NAPHTHOL TAR RESIDUES LYING IN THE PREMISES OF MS EIL FORMERLY MS UCIL, BHOPAL. This report by the Indian Institute of Chemical Technology, Hyderabad, covers pages 15 – 119.
PoisonPapers1 16.pdf
Contents
PoisonPapers1 17.pdf
Undated letter from K.V. Raghavan of IICT Hyderabad to MPPCB announcing completion of the report.
PoisonPapers1 18.pdf
Undated letter from Dr Sajid Hussain of IICT Hyderabad to MPCCB, attaching report. Referring to MPPCB letter of Sept 15, 1997 asking for the report, upon receipt of which the final instalment of 2.5 lakhs could be released. Recommends a dedicated incinerator.
PoisonPapers1 19.pdf
PoisonPapers1 20.pdf
PoisonPapers1 21.pdf
PoisonPapers1 22.pdf
PoisonPapers1 23.pdf
Introduction to IICT report
PoisonPapers1 24.pdf
PoisonPapers1 25.pdf
Collection of samples and characterisation of residues
PoisonPapers1 26.pdf
Table 1 – Proximate analysis of Sevin and Naphthol tar residues
PoisonPapers1 27.pdf
Table II – Ultimate analysis of above
PoisonPapers1 28.pdf
Table III – Physical properties of the tars
PoisonPapers1 29.pdf
Table IV – Solubility
PoisonPapers1 30.pdf
Table V – Presence of other elements
PoisonPapers1 31.pdf
PoisonPapers1 32.pdf
PoisonPapers1 33.pdf
PoisonPapers1 34.pdf
PoisonPapers1 35.pdf
Charts detailing results
PoisonPapers1 36.pdf
Studies on treatment methods
PoisonPapers1 37.pdf
Treatability train, 7 possibilities
PoisonPapers1 38.pdf
Chemical treatment
PoisonPapers1 39.pdf
Table VI
PoisonPapers1 40.pdf
PoisonPapers1 41.pdf
Table VII
PoisonPapers1 42.pdf
Table VIII
PoisonPapers1 43.pdf
Table IX
PoisonPapers1 44.pdf
Electro-oxidation
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PoisonPapers1 46.pdf
Table X
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Table XI
PoisonPapers1 48.pdf
Table XII
PoisonPapers1 49.pdf
PoisonPapers1 50.pdf
Reverse osmosis
PoisonPapers1 51.pdf
Table XIII
PoisonPapers1 52.pdf
Biodegradation
PoisonPapers1 53.pdf
PoisonPapers1 54.pdf
Charts of reaction
PoisonPapers1 54.pdf
PoisonPapers1 56.pdf
Chart XIV results
PoisonPapers1 57.pdf
Thermogram Alpha Naphthol
PoisonPapers1 58.pdf
Thermogram naphthol tar
PoisonPapers1 59.pdf
Thermogram Sevin tar
PoisonPapers1 60.pdf
Pyrogram of naphthol at 590˚C
PoisonPapers1 61.pdf
MS spectrum peak
PoisonPapers1 62.pdf
PoisonPapers1 63.pdf
Compounds from pyrolysis of Sevin tar at 590˚C
PoisonPapers1 64.pdf
Pyrogram of sevin tar at 590˚C
PoisonPapers1 65.pdf
MS spectrum peak
PoisonPapers1 66.pdf
Diagram for design of a dedicated incinerator
PoisonPapers1 68.pdf
Compounds from pyrolysis of naphthol at 590˚C
PoisonPapers1 69.pdf
Collaborative work with NEERI
PoisonPapers1 70.pdf
Chromatogram of extracted Sevin tar sample sent by NEERI
PoisonPapers1 71.pdf
Chromatogram of extracted Naphthol tar sample sent by NEERI
PoisonPapers1 72.pdf
PoisonPapers1 73.pdf
Conclusions
PoisonPapers1 74.pdf
Proposal for undertaking work for MPPCB
PoisonPapers1 75.pdf
Annexure I (report that follows)
PoisonPapers1 76.pdf
REPORT ON THE ANALYSIS OF SEVIN AND NAPHTHOL TAR RESIDUES
<strongPoisonPapers1 77.pdf
Contents
PoisonPapers1 78.pdf
Confirmatory accompanying letter
PoisonPapers1 79.pdf
Plan of work
PoisonPapers1 80.pdf
PoisonPapers1 81.pdf
PoisonPapers1 82.pdf
Determination of Naphthol content
PoisonPapers1 83.pdf
PoisonPapers1 84.pdf
PoisonPapers1 85.pdf
Specific gravity
PoisonPapers1 86.pdf
Table 1
PoisonPapers1 87.pdf
Table 2
PoisonPapers1 88.pdf
Table 3
PoisonPapers1 89.pdf
December 17, 1989. Letter from Mr Khare of MPPCB to the Director, Regional Research Lab, Hyderabad, referring to letter received from Mr M.S. Murty, Advisor (Chemicals), Government of India Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, Delhi. The letter was sent via the MPPCB and seems to have inspired them to snap into action. Murty’s letter (below) orders MPPCB/UCIL to send samples of Sevin and Naphthol tars to RRL Hyderabad for extremely urgent analysis. MPPCB’s letter confirms it is sending the samples and says they should be analysed “on lines suggested” by Murthy. The matter is so urgent that the work should begin before there is even time to draw up a contract and agree payment amounts. A handwritten note added to the letter informs Dr Sajid Hussain that the Director wished to discuss the matter with him on December 31, 1989.
PoisonPapers1 90.pdf
Procedure for determination of naphthol in naphthol and sevin tar samples
PoisonPapers1 91.pdf
Detemination of methanol and other insoluble matter
PoisonPapers1 92.pdf
Extraction of naphthol from sevin tar residue
PoisonPapers1 93.pdf
December 14, 1989. Letter from Murthy at GoI Ministry of Industry, Dept of Chemicals and Petrochemicals giving decisions of a meeting at which were present: Dr S. Vardarajan, Shri Shyamal(?) Ghosh (Joint Secretary, Bhopal Gas Relief Departpment, GoMP), Dr G. Sundaram (Joint Secretary, GoI Dept of Environment) and Shri V.N. Kaul (Secretary, GoMP). The tests for Naphthol residue to be performed were for: i) methyl carbamate acid (ii) 1-naptha phenol (iii) 1-Napthol amine (iv) Napthol dicarbamate (v) specific gravity (vi) viscosity (vii) corrosive properties (viii) mixability (?) with coal tar at 70˚-80˚centigrade (ix) any release of poisonous gas at 80˚ centigrade.
PoisonPapers1 94.pdf
High toxicity of samples, handwritten chart
PoisonPapers1 95.pdf
Acute toxicity of Naphthol tar study carried out on Tilapia mossambica fish
PoisonPapers1 96.pdf
Acute toxicity of Sevin tar study carried out on Tilapia mossambica fish
PoisonPapers1 97.pdf
Naphthol mortality chart
PoisonPapers1 98.pdf
Sevin mortality chart
PoisonPapers1 99.pdf
Acute toxicity study of Sevin tar on T mossambica fish
PoisonPapers1 100.pdf
Sevin mortality chart
PoisonPapers1 101.pdf
[Indecipherable] Naphthol reaction with ether
PoisonPapers1 102.pdf
PoisonPapers1 103.pdf
Charts of gas analysis
PoisonPapers1 104.pdf
Annexure II
PoisonPapers1 105.pdf
Interim Report on Disposal of Hazardous Waste
PoisonPapers1 106.pdf.
Preamble refers to letter rec’d by writer 1.1.89???
PoisonPapers1 107.pdf
results of proximate and ultimate analyses
PoisonPapers1 108.pdf
Specially fabricated apparatus
PoisonPapers1 109.pdf
Table 3. Combustion of Naphthol tar
PoisonPapers1 110.pdf
Table 4 Combustion of Sevin tar
PoisonPapers1 111.pdf
experiments in an open blatta
PoisonPapers1 112.pdf
important considerations
PoisonPapers1 113.pdf
collaborating engineering companies
PoisonPapers1 114.pdf
Re rec’d Sevin samples mentions letter of 16 May 98 says can’t be analysed using previous methods, further work to be planned
PoisonPapers1 115.pdf
[Indecipherable]
PoisonPapers1 116.pdf
apparatus diagram fig 1, ref p108
PoisonPapers1 117.pdf
Annexure III
PoisonPapers1 118.pdf
Chemical treatment, electro-oxidation
PoisonPapers1 119.pdf
Title of project, scope of work
PoisonPapers1 120.pdf
PoisonPapers1 121.pdf
MPPCB to EIIL 5.2.99 pinning responsibiity for clean up on them, signed VK Jain
PoisonPapers1 122.pdf
PoisonPapers1 123.pdf
Review meeting with MPPCB on 1.4.98 states that material had been quietly taken away and buried in various govt “nurseries” scattered all over – five lakhs changes hands
PoisonPapers1 124.pdf
PoisonPapers1 125.pdf
EIIL Harayan reply to MPPCB Jain p120 letter washes hands of site. Rejects polluter pays liability, which predates Hazardous Waste Rules 1989
PoisonPapers1 126.pdf
Harayan to District Industries Centre. April 21 1998.
PoisonPapers1 127.pdf
p2 List of buildings in use***
PoisonPapers1 128.pdf
June 29, 1998. Letter in Hindi from DIC to EIIL requiring them to surrender the site in ten days’ time, on 10 July 1998,
PoisonPapers1 129.pdf
PoisonPapers1 130.pdf
PoisonPapers1 131.pdf
MPPCB petition to High Court Jabalpur reporting the handover and asking Court to direct DIC to make Union Carbide Bhopal pay up. Also cites possibility of groundwater contamination “after about 23 years”.
PoisonPapers1 132.pdf
Oct 20, 1992. Norman Gaines announces his early retirement , one day before he clears his desk. To S. Bose of UCIL
PoisonPapers1 133.pdf
Gokhale /UCIL logo
PoisonPapers1 134.pdf
July 28, 1992. Vijay Gokhaleof UCIL to Bose, Basu, re pending ADL fees, Langseth fees. Refers to proposed Langseth (David Langseth of ADL) site visit in August 92, doubts whether Bose/CPL(??) feel the site is conducive to such a visit. Refers to Bose visit to NY in Sept and a forthcoming meeting in Singapore.
PoisonPapers1 135.pdf
PoisonPapers1 136.pdf
PoisonPapers1 137.pdf
PoisonPapers1 138.pdf
Memo April 6, 1982 from MD Buckingham UCAP to Norm Gaines at UCC and UCIL managers. About the two sites in Bhopal, the 65 acre factory site and 34 acre site containing three solar evaporation ponds. “Both sites remain essentially as they were in December 1984.” Clean up standards to be determined by NEERI/ADL and be acceptable to GoI. Site leases to be relinquished as soon as feasible. “Credibility” is to be maintained with NEERI, GoI and MP state agencies. C.K. Harayan, UCIL’s plant manager is to the US for training mid 1992.
PoisonPapers1 139.pdf
Site Rehab Action steps July 28, 1992
PoisonPapers1 140.pdf
March 30,1992. UCIL’s Bose to UCC’s Gaines, referring to meeting in Singapore on Mar 17, 1992, gives results of analysis of well water outside the factory including R and C presumably the two wells in Atal Ayub Nagar, which has just come up. The wells are ‘unstable’. V5 is contaminated.
PoisonPapers1 141.pdf
Chart, V5 smells strongly of napthaline, 100/100 mortality of fish (percentage deaths after 24 and 48 hrs).
PoisonPapers1 142.pdf
PoisonPapers1 143.pdf
PoisonPapers1 144.pdf
Assessment of contamination in land-fill areas. Several samples produce 100/100 mortality of fish
PoisonPapers1 145.pdf
Gaines to Langseth April 24, 1992, attaching pp141-4
PoisonPapers1 146.pdf
Report: Internal Investigations of Ground Water and Soil at UCIL Bhopal plant premises, by Harayan and Kanhere, August 7, 1992 (This shows that Harayan switched seamlessly from UCIL to EIIL)
PoisonPapers1 147.pdf
Report, Objective, Background, Need for Investigation
PoisonPapers1 148.pdf
Scope of Investigation, Assessment of Land Environment
PoisonPapers1 149.pdf
Bio assay test giving method used and killing carp cuprinus(sic) carpio
PoisonPapers1 150.pdf
Hydrogeological study, borewells
PoisonPapers1 151.pdfPoisonPapers1 151.pdf
Analysis, Results
PoisonPapers1 152.pdf
Chart of wells and analysis outside pond boundary wall, showing 2 wells in Garib Nagar near the Solar Evaporation Ponds
PoisonPapers1 153.pdf
Table 1. Products produced at site, dates and quantities
PoisonPapers1 154.pdf
PoisonPapers1 155.pdf
Table 2. Material consumption 1975-1984
PoisonPapers1 156.pdf
Assessment of contaminants in landfill
PoisonPapers1 157.pdf
Tubewell samples
PoisonPapers1 158.pdf
Factory plan diagram showing location of soil and water samples
PoisonPapers1 159.pdf
Tubewell V-5a construction details diagram
PoisonPapers1 160.pdf
Tubewell V-13a construction details
PoisonPapers1 161.pdf
November 23, 1992. From Harayan to Bose. V-5a and V-13a had not been bio-assayed for want of fish. Now it has been done and he attaches updated charts of results.
PoisonPapers1 162.pdf
V-5a is 100/100 deadly, V-13a two samples, nil/nil
PoisonPapers1 163.pdf
Factory plan again, someone has circled Temik disposal site
PoisonPapers1 164.pdf
PoisonPapers1 165.pdf
Memo to Gaines from Mike Buckingham of UCAP ANWGDV1 (?) April 26, 1992 revealing matter was discussed in Danbury on April 3, 1992. Bose, who is in town (Singapore?) wants further review of NEERI draft specifications and wants David Langseth to visit in August. UCIL’s C.K. Harayan to receive training in the US.
PoisonPapers1 166.pdf
Jan 21, 1993. Gokhale to Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers.
PoisonPapers1 167.pdf
PoisonPapers1 168.pdf
Gokhale to CBI June 29, 1993 announcing plans to conduct a study and begin dismantling parts of the plant, non-MIC areas, acknowledges deterioration of plant structures. Everything has been lying “as is where is” for the past eight years.
PoisonPapers1 169.pdf
CBI to Gokhale July 20, 1993 not wanting the CBI to be made a party to anything UCIL does at the site
BOX II
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